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Abstract 
Time has proved that Economic Analysis is not enough as to ensure all the needs of the economic field. 
The present study wishes to propose a new approach method of the economic phenomena and processes based 
on the researches made outside the economic space- a new general interpretation theory- which is centered on 
the human being as the basic actor of economy. A general interpretation theory must assure the interpretation of 
the causalities among the economic phenomena and processes- causal interpretation; the interpretation of the 
correlations  and  dependencies  among  indicators-  normative  interpretation;  the  interpretation  of  social  and 
communicational  processes  in  economic  organizations-  social  and  communicational  interpretation;  the 
interpretation  of  the  community  status  of  companies-  transsocial  interpretation;  the  interpretation  of  the 
purposes of human activities and their coherency – teleological interpretation; the interpretation of equilibrium/ 
disequilibrium  from  inside  the  economic  systems-  optimality  interpretation.  In  order  to  respond  to  such 
demands,  rigor,  pragmatism,  praxiology  and  contextual  connectors  are  required.  In  order  to  progress,  the 
economic science must improve its language, both its syntax and its semantics. The clarity of exposure requires a 
language clarity and the scientific theory progress asks for the need of hypotheses in the building of the theories. 
The switch from the common language to the symbolic one means the switch from ambiguity to rigor and 
rationality, that is order in thinking. But order implies structure, which implies formalization. Our paper should 
be a plea for these requirements, requirements which should be fulfilled by a modern interpretation theory. 
 
Keywords:  general  interpretation  theory,  economic  hermeneutics,  semiotics,  rigor,  pragmatics,  praxiology, 
language, linguistic instruments.  
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1.Introducerea şi contextul studiului 
We might ask ourselves the question why do we need a general interpretation theory of the economic 
processes and phenomena as long as we have a specialized subject – Economic Analysis. We agree on the fact 
that the Economic Analysis must be the subject that provides the management the “most detailed possible” 
pieces of information based on the interpretation of the account and of the financial reports. It is thus possible to 
take urgent corrective action, without too much subjective interference (Băileșteanu, 2010, p. 199). We need 
quick interventions, based on a high certainty level, the cause- effect relation being, most of the time, obvious 
from the economic analysis. The Economic Analysis is a rapid and precise instrument, but a limited one. The 
enlargement of its “tasks” would lead to the decrease of its accuracy. This would imply the deprivation of 
management of its most handy instrument for urgent and quite well argued decisions. We believe that besides 
Analysis,  the  building  of  a  general  interpretation  theory  of  the  economic  processes  and  phenomena  is 
appropriate in order to explain the still unanswered questions in economy. An interpretation theory which gives 
up figures, must be sustained by proper theoretical instruments in order not to be subjective. Therefore we 
enunciate the requirements of a general interpretation theory. Even if the proposed methods do not belong to the 
economic field, we consider that they can be also implemented there.  
 
2. The premises of a general interpretation theory 
Ever since the ancient times, people have felt the need of interpretation and started their endeavor with 
the “The Book of all Books”, The Bible. There have been and still are several interpretation patterns (depending 
on the author) which were given to the apostolic writings- Luke, Paul, Matthew- and to the texts of the Old and 
New Testament.  
The church commentators have been concerned with the finding of an unitary interpretation pattern 
which may lead to the origins (as Heidegger used to say), at the original meaning given by apostles to the texts 
and consequently, to the “primary”, to Christ’s “words”. All these interpretations regarded a primary issue of the 
human existence, a fundamental problem of Christianity, Judaism and Islamism etc. In order to distinguish such 
basic  interpretations  from  others,  people  felt  the  need  to  “name”  them.  The  term  “hermeneutics”  has  been 
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chosen. The selection of the term was not at random, but by analogy with Hermes, who passed on/ interpreted 
the Gods’ will to the people. Actually the name of this science is understanding and interpretation of holy texts, 
in brief hermeneutics, in the same way in which the understanding and interpretation of the symbols is briefly 
called  semantics.    Developing  this  science  of  the  interpretation  of  sacred  texts,  Ricoeur,  Rorty,  Heidegger, 
Gadamer and some other, all back up the idea of understanding, interpretation, meditation. If we were to analyze 
the  current  meaning  of  the  term  understanding,  we  might  ask  ourselves  if  it  does  have  a  purpose  near 
interpretation. Of course not- one can not interpret what one does not understand. If we were to think at the past 
the meaning of interpretation must be associated to the translation of the old, sacred texts. There have also been 
suggested philosophical nuances. Interpretation occurs there where we have more than one meaning- that is 
polysemy. Interpretation aims at “finding the origins”, “the primary”, but this approach must get over the barrier 
of the relativity of interpretation. Despite the subjectivism which is inherent in such situations, what we wish for 
is actually finding the “remanences” which may sustain the interpretative approach.  
Texts, either scientific, philosophical or theological, have a meaning or a plurality of meanings. The 
meaning(s) is/are not “visible”, it/ they must be extracted  “through a concrete and live act of a person, act which 
we  usually  call  understanding,  or,  in  its  elaborated  form,  interpretation  (Cercel,  2010,  p.  19).  But  what  is 
interpretation,  which  is  the  genesis  and  the  structure  of  this  interpretation  process  through  which  signs  are 
discovered and projected? “As soon as we pay attention not only to the texts, their phenomena and meanings, but 
also to the comprehensive process which makes possible their manifestation, we become aware of the fact that 
not only the meaning, but also the understanding as well as the interpretation, lay under the sign of a plurality of 
possibilities. The reflection on these concrete possibilities and the possibility conditions of understanding and 
interpretation is known in general under the name of hermeneutics” (Cercel, 2010, p. 20). 
The general interpretation theory must assure: the interpretation of the causalities among the economic 
phenomena and processes- causal interpretation; the interpretation of the correlations and dependencies among 
indicators- normative interpretation; the interpretation of social and communicational processes in economic 
organizations-  social  and  communicational  interpretation;  the  interpretation  of  the  community  status  of 
companies- transsocial interpretation; the interpretation of the purposes of human activities and their coherency – 
teleological interpretation; the interpretation of equilibrium/ disequilibrium from inside the economic systems- 
optimality interpretation.  
As process, the general interpretation theory aims at: understanding the economic phenomana through 
semantics and intuition, finding new meanings through deduction and inferencies, interpreting the economic 
complexity  through  meditation  on  multiple  causalities,  formalizing  the  economic  information  through 
simbolization and language, facilitating the decision based on the support of complex axiomatic systems, the 
validation of the decision through argumantation. In order to answer to such requirements, the interpretation 
theory appeals at the  semantic instruments. In the  interpretative approach  we  will use  logic semantics  and 
economic semiotics.  We  will understand the logic semiotics as part of the  methodology  which  studies the 
language of the logic systems from three perspectives: syntactic (logic syntax), semantic (logic semantics) and 
pragmatic (logic pragmatics) (Enescu, 2003, p. 6).  Economic semiotics is a part of the metatheory that studies 
the language of the economic systems having two main objectives: the extension of the use of signs in the 
economic theory and practice; the building of axiomatic systems capable of assuring the clarification of the 
economic  science.  Economic  semiotics-  a  general  sign  theory-  allows  a  “form”,  but  also  a  “substance” 
interpretation. Through a symbol, people surpass the perception level and reach the understanding level, they go 
from senses to thinking, from appearance to essence, from momentary to permanent (Wald, 42/1979). Every sign 
stands  for  something;  but  not  every  sign  has  a  signification,  a  meaning.  “The  sign,  in  the  sense  of  a  hint 
(Anzeichen) does not express anything except the situation when it fulfils, besides the indication function, a 
signification function” (Husserl, 2009, p. 43). We will also work with the signification concept, doctrine which 
the Stoics called semiotike. We will be interested in the relations between signs (syntax), the relations between 
signs and the objects they refer to (semantics), the relations between signs and the subjects who use them. For 
formalization, except signs, we also need the language: the symbolic language allows the expression in a certain 
form  of  that  what,  in  common  language,  may  lead  to  endless  misunderstandings.  That  is  “there  where  the 
common language hides its logical structure, there where it allows the building of pseudo-sentences, there where 
it uses a single term for an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it with a symbol which gives us a 
clear image of the logical structure… and uses its terms in an unambiguous way” (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 209). 
The  language  implies  rules  of  the  relations  between  signs.  These  rules  establish  causalities  and  normative 
evaluations. It is our goal that during the interpretation process we shall use the instruments of logics: judgment, 
reasoning, tautology, validity, consistency, axiomatization etc.  
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3. Interpretation vs. understanding  
The finality of the interpretative act is understanding, which has as main intermediate contextualization. 
Interpretation is considered an ensemble of rules which argues the experience. Interpretation is transitive- its 
finality is to be understood, intransitive- its finality is to understand itself, and normative or dogmatic, just like 
the teleological juridical one- its finality is the implementation settlement. At the same time interpretation is 
synchronic, when the pursuit of systematization prevails, and diachronic – when history prevails. 
In  the  approach  we  are  undergoing  we  distinguish  between  interpretation  and  understanding.  We 
normally associate understanding with the identification of the meaning of a word, text and with the shaping of a 
satisfying mental image. The necessary procedures for understanding are largely standardized by dictionaries, 
scientific papers etc. Interpretation is the attribution of a meaning or a signification to different finds of facts: 
attitudes, events, contexts, etc. The attribution of meaning is based on a referential system made up by the 
previous  knowledge  of  the  interpreting  subject  and  which  is  a  compulsory  premise  for  understanding. 
Consequently, understanding gives a meaning, while interpretation designates a meaning – attributing – process.  
In our research  we  will be guided by  what  we call “the principle of all principles”: the economic 
research must start from the direct analysis, from intuition which facilitates the access towards the essence of the 
economic phenomena and processes, like they truly are in their originality, that is independently of the previous 
theoretical suppositions (the relevance of the primary). We try to reach the “primary” with the help of the object- 
historical and actual- historical method developed by Heidegger – an entirely hermeneutic approach. We also 
believe that the hermeneutic approach must be valued, otherwise we may remain in the ascertaining phase. 
Through valorization we aim at: identifying the causalities which governed the evolution phenomenology and 
will  influence  the  perspective-  the  observed  relevance;  identifying  the  orientating  options  of  the  future 
trajectory – the observed reality; and meditating on the unexpected and on the possible risks/ opportunities – 
possible future. The  valorization of the  hermeneutic approach can be done  with  the  help of a prospective 
approach. In this sense, the general interpretation theory in economy is a symbiosis between the hermeneutic and 
the prospective approach. 
 
4. The need for rigor, hypotheses, formalization and reasoning 
  The  interpretation  theory  can  not  progress  unless  it  improves  its  language,  both  its  syntax  and  its 
semantics. The clarity of exposure asks for a clarity of language, and the extension of the scientific theory asks 
for  rigor.  The  need  for  rigor  implies  the  need  of  hypotheses  in  the  building  of  the  interpretation  theory 
(Băileșteanu, 2010, p. 31).  There are some constructiveness and functionality conditions of the hypotheses and 
their fulfillment gives them the position of “status” in science: the hypothetical constructions must not contain 
internal malfunctions, that is incompatible or difficult to reconcile postulates. The need for hypotheses implies 
the need for mathematics without which the interpretation is convicted to remain to the intuitive- empiric level. 
Mathematics offers the interpretation theory rationality.  Rigor and rationality mean order in thinking. Order 
means structure, which again implies formalization. Structure, at a first level, appears to be a system of elements 
which make up the anatomy or the hard of the phenomena, notwithstanding its fiziology. At the next level we 
encounter the totality- structure, where the relations and the fiziology prevails, structurality being actually a 
relation system. At this level of interpretation the whole prevails, not the part. At the last level we find the 
invariant- structure, meaning that what we observe by contrast with what changes (Băileșteanu, 2010, p. 31). 
  In order to become a structure, the interpretation theory must surpass the formality level, that would 
facilitate: the leap from the apparent incoherence of facts to their basic coherence, the leap from description to 
deduction, the leap from the part perspective to the totality perspective, the leap from division to the space 
integration, the leap from phenomena to essence (Botezatu, 1973, p. 2). The formalization implies symbolization 
as  a  premise  of  the  switch  from  common  to  symbolic  language.  The  interpretation  theory  must  assimilate 
concepts  from semiotics such as: signs, the symbolizing- codifying rules, the laws of use of signs and the 
signification rules. 
5.  The need for pragmatics  
Bar – Hillel, Montague, and others understand under pragmatics the study of indexed  expressions, 
meaning of those expressions whose significance depends on their utilization context. Rudolf Carnap considers 
that pragmatics studies concepts as: opinion, assertion,  utterance (Enescu,  2003, p.  371). In Chris Moriss’ 
vision, pragmatics  “has to do  with the biotic aspects of  the semio-said, accordingly  with all psychological, 
biological and sociological phenonema that can be observed in the functionality of signs” (Morris, 1978, p. 98). 
We  think  that  in  the  interpretation  theory,  pragmatics  should  be  approached  from  the  perspective  of  the 
behavioral aspects of the interpreter regarding the perception, interpretation and manifestation of the signs (and 
symbols), perspective that implies both a theoretical and a practical dimension. The theoretical dimension refers 
to  the  ideas,  the  ideas  derived  from  the  essence  of  the  interpreted  economic  cathegory  and  from  the 
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interconnection of pragmatics with syntax and semantics. The concrete dimension analyses the attitude of the 
interpreting person towards the interpreted object. We exemplify the following pragmatic interpretations: 
-  any  action,  work,  decision,  even  minor,  influences  the  level  and  the  dynamic  of  the  economic 
efficiency,  which,  in  other  words,  is  sensitive  and  anti-  catastrophical    to  the  small  modifications  of  its 
component elements (resources and effects); 
- even if in many cases the human actions may work compensatory- that is some negative consequences 
can be compensated by other positive ones-, still, they always influence both the resources and the effects and 
consequently they must be identified; 
-the more one climbs up the decision ladder, the more grows the influence of the decisional actions on 
the resources, effects and economic efficiency; 
- dynamically speaking, the efficiency indicators must increase, as a sign of the system development. 
When this does not happen, the causes which influenced the involution must be identified. 
   
6. The need for praxiology  
  The praxiological vision for which professor Mises militated, is adopted by more and more scientists in 
the economic field (Lancaster, 1973, p. 138). Kotarbinski understands under general methodology or parxiology 
the science of models of making anything in any way, the science that  perceives  work from the efficiency 
perspective, regardless of the specific conditions, an essential human action (Körner, 1969).  The interpreting 
theory can not dispense with praxiology, because it has its roots in the observation of the practical activities, of 
the human action, operating with basic concepts: function, purpose, means, activities etc (Băileșteanu, 2010,  p. 
39). We believe that the general interpretation theory must use instruments and concepts that are also used in 
praxiology: function, purpose, means, activities etc., because every activity must have a function (the meeting of 
the functional requirement or the need around which any organized system is built, represents the final function 
of that system), a purpose (routine purpose, foreseeable purpose, possible purpose, probable purpose) and the 
means for achievement (the human, material and financial resources).  
 
7. The need for linguistic instruments 
The linguistic instruments began being used in economy
1: because, that, evidence that, actually, given 
the fact that, how, now, so/ therefore, consequently, that is why. The future research directions should focus on 
the  use  of  these  linguistic  instruments  in  the  argumentative  process;  the  symbolization  of  these  linguistic 
instruments so that they may be integrated in the modern informatic processes; the setting of semantic and 
syntactic use rules for these argumentative indicators. From an economic perspective we mention the following: 
-  we must take into account the fact that the argumentative indicators – if, so, how, etc.- are 
theirselves relative, and consequently, not always „if →then” is a immutable rule (if the turnover grows, 
then the profit grows- is not always a valid argumentative statement); 
-  we think it is better to perceive the conclusions as deductions, not as absolute consequences, 
because in many cases, the hypotheses may be only probable; 
-  the wording never  should be used only in exceptional situations. 
The general argumentative rule must contain an arugment (A), an opinion (O), supportive techniques 
(T), validation techniques (V). 
R= f(A,O,T,V) 
 
8. The Limits of interpretative theories  
The interpretative theories must be consistent with the data, taking into account that each theory is 
underdetermined by data, in other words the truth or the falsity can never be determined by only resorting to 
data. 
It must be verified if the theory is coherent and consistent with other theories which have been accepted 
and if it might be interconnected with them from a conceptual perspective. Ian G. Barbour emphasizes the 
purpose of the theory, thus checking if the theory manages to unite theories which had been previously disparate, 
if it answers to multiple proof, if is applicable on long terms or with relevant variables. (Lemeni, Ionescu). The 
theory which we have suggested has more limits.   
 
8.1. The limits of the inductive interpretation 
                                                 
1 Lo Cascio,  Vincenzo, Gramatica argumentării, Editura Meteora Press, București,  2002; 
Sălăvastru, Constantin, Teoria și practica argumentării, Editura Polirom, Iași,  2003; Băileșteanu, Gheorghe, 
Teorie  economică,  Editura  Mirton,  Timișoara,  2010;  Woods,  John,    Walton,  Douglas,  Critique  de 
l’argumentation, Logiques des sophinsnes ordinoiros, Editura Kimé, Paris, 2000. 
154Annals of the „Constantin Brâncuşi” University of Târgu Jiu, Economy Series, Issue 3/2013 
 
„ACADEMICA BRÂNCUŞI” PUBLISHER, ISSN 1844 – 7007 
 
 
  Induction is a process of generalization, a reasoning by which we move from findings about singular 
cases  to  assertions  about  all  the  cases.  If  the  multitude  of  observed  objects  is  finite,  then  the  induction  is 
complete, in principle at least. But, excepting our special and temporal limits, all the cases can be identified and 
observed.  
This is an exception which cannot be found in reality, even if it is economic or social.  
If  the  multitude  of  facts  is  not  infinite,  then  in  principle  the  induction  is  incomplete,  in  other  words  it  is 
amplificatory. The distinction between the complete induction and the incomplete induction is one of principle. 
Regarding the complete induction, if the premises are true, the conclusion is true, whereas in the incomplete 
induction (amplificatory) the conclusion can be at most credible based on some conditions. According to the 
factors which make it believable, to the level of believability, the conclusion can be (Enescu, 2003, p. 199): 
  The number of the cases which were observed: the more cases we have analyzed, the more 
believable the conclusion becomes;   
  The manner of choosing the cases: the level of credibility increases if the choice is made based 
on some rules or at random; 
  the relation between the property “F” and the property which is characteristic to the class of 
objects; 
  the relation between the property “F” and other universal properties of the objects from classes; 
  the deductive use of the conclusion.  
Irrespective of the situation, the limits of the inductive interpretation are obvious. Peter Godfrey Smith 
was  wondering:  “What  reasons  do  we  have  to  expect  that  the  patterns  which  we  have  noticed  in  our  past 
experience could be valid for the future too? What justification do we have to use the observations from the past 
as the fundament for the generalizations referring to things that we have not noticed yet?  (Smith, 2012, p. 40). In 
the same manner, David Hume asked himself since 1739, if we have a reason to think that the future could be 
similar with the past. He said that there is no contradiction in assumption that the future could be different from 
the past.  
Naturally, that we share this argumentation and we mention that the defining of the theories by which 
the generalization of the patterns which were noticed experimentally should be made with prudence, taking into 
account the fact that the relations between the data and the theories are rather more complex. They involve the 
imagination, thus we cannot trace any rule.  
In these cases the analogy can play the role of conceptual model in the characterization of an assumption which 
can be only observed directly.  
Also, we consider important for knowledge the “rigidity” in limiting the induction. This would mean giving up 
generalizations and altogether a contradiction with reality.  
Surely if we refer to the most simple and most traditional examples of induction (we see a multitude of white 
swans and none of other color, what reasons do we have then to believe that all the swans are white?), we have 
an interpretation, but if we refer to Darwin’s theory of evolution, the interpretation is entirely different.  
From the perspective of our interpretative process, we believe that the shades are important. Peter Godfrey Smith 
considered that a form of inference which is closely connected to induction is the projection, using two types of 
non deductive inference: induction and explanatory inference (Smith, 2012, p. 43). In projection, Godfrey said, 
we infer starting from a number of observed cases to reach a prediction about the following case, and not to a 
generalization about all the cases (we see a series of white swans and we infer that the following swan will be a 
white swan). This, we say, can be named an immediate prediction which flows from an observed event, which is 
very probable a continuous one.  
However, there are also other cases of inferent undeductive predictions. In the 80s Luis and Walter Alvarez have 
claimed that 65 millions years ago a huge meteorite hit the Earth, causing explosions and calamitous changes of 
climate.  
An  important  key  in  favor  of  this  explanation  is  the  presence  of  rare  chemical  elements  in  high 
quantities, such as the iridium, which can be found in strata of the Earth crust, 65 millions years old. (Alvarez, 
L., Alvarez, W., Asaro, Michel, 1980: 208, p. 1095- 1108). 
  This  type  of  interferences  Godfrey  named  explanatory  inferences,  Peirce  named  them  adductive 
inferences, while Harman and Lipton “inferences to the best explanation” (Harman, 1965, p. 88-95). Unlike the 
inductive influence (the inference from particular cases to generalizations), the explanatory inference is defined 
as an inference from a set of data to a hypothesis about a structure or a process which explains the data (Smith, 
2012, p. 299). From our point of view, the ones who try to cancel the differences between explanation and 
prediction make the mistake in not seeing the “what it has been” from “what it will be” or “what it could be”. At 
least, at  theoretical level,  when  we explain  “something”,  we already  know  that that one  has happened and 
eventually  we  can  prove  that  it  could  have  been  anticipated.  When  we  make  a  projection  we  start  from 
“something” which we have identified to an argument which contains a law of nature (premises, hypotheses or 
whichever we want to name them) and we issue a conclusion which is more or less achievable.   
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The explanation will not be considered a formal deduction, but an argumentation which uses notions 
with a precise signification. The object of the explanation is not abstract entity, but real phenomena. The relation 
between the explanation and prediction is approached in the following manner:  
-  in the case of explanation, the consequence “C” took place because  there had been initial 
phenomena “S”, future phenomena were produced “U” and based on laws “L”, the consequence was 
produced; thus, the consequence is explained through premises and through laws of governing. From a 
temporal perspective the consequence “C” is based on the events which have already taken place. Its 
truth depends on the capacity of the interpreter to understand and assert correctly the premises:  
-  in the case of prediction, the consequence is fundamented on the initial phenomena, the ones 
which are expected to take place and on the laws which govern them. The prediction is based on “what 
it has been” but also on “what it will be”; 
-  in the case of the explanation, the level of relativity is given by the capacity of the interpreter 
of perceiving what it has been , which in the case of prediction appears as the unpredictable.  
 
 
8.2. The limits of the deductive interpretation 
 
   The interpretation in the  field of economics and of the social cannot generalize  the assumption of 
transitivity. If, for example, “X” is friend with a “Y” and “Y” is friend with a “Z”, we cannot say that at most 
“X” is friend with a “Z”. If from a logical perspective, the clarity is undeniable (the truth of the premise leads to 
the truth of the conclusion), from the perspective of the gnosiological interpretation the things are different. We 
can never say that if “a has overtaken b in a sports competition and b has overtaken c, then a will outrun c in a 
direct competitive context”.  
This thing is not possible as the context changes. Our research demands a special attention to the context because 
of this reason and we will try to show that the context has a determinant role in prediction.  
  The limits of the interpretation are connected to the limits of the pattern of interpretation, which Petre 
Botezatu calls the antinomy of power (the growth of the power of the syntactic system, its “ambition”) of being 
interpreted in a broader theory, the antinomy of purity (the elimination from the intuitive suppositions from 
demonstration leads to the insufficiency of the fundament), the antinomy of preciseness (the preciseness of the 
terms is doubled by the idealization of the objects, of the reference if the theory, which can take us in the 
situation, which is not a pleasant one, of dealing with something else than we have intended), the antinomy of 
abstractness (the abstractness of the structures implies the indetermination of the theory). 
  The limits of interpretation also take into account the impossibility of anticipating the “unknown”, then 
when we consider the prospective discourse. Many researchers of the future have fallen into this trap, people 
who are Nobel awarded. The conclusions which can be taken from the projects “The Limits of growth” or 
“humankind at crossroads”, “the new international order”, “the catastrophe or the new society” have not passed 
the test of time.  
 
9. Concluzii 
Without minimalizing or neutralizing the importance of the economic paradigms, already existent, (the 
paradigm  of  the  “invisible  hand”,  the  one  of  interventionism  etc.)  or  the  role  of  econometrics  and  of  the 
economic analysis, time is a factor of decision and has showed their limits in their confrontation with the reality 
of the phenomena and of the economic processes.  
A general theory of interpretation might avoid, so we consider, the undervaluation of the potential of 
the  science  and  technology,  the  overvaluation  of  the  impact  of  the  remodeling  of  needs,  the  insignificant 
importance given to the change of the systems of value, the change of the individual, common, social and global 
mentalities.  In  evaluations  we  have  to  take  into  account  the  historic  continuity,  without  ignoring  the 
discontinuity. In economics, and especially in macroeconomics, the solutions do not submit exclusively to a 
logic  reasoning  (formal:  true,  false)  but  to  a  pragmatic  reasoning.  If  we  refer  to  the  prospective  economic 
research, this should be made with other tools than with the ones of the econometrics, namely with the positivist 
science. To control the perspective by means of patterns entirely, means to know by now everything that is going 
to happen. In the complexity of the nowadays  world, the “tunnel  vision” of the expert is as an  inefficient 
approach as the thinking of the Cartesian reasoning. In economics there is not only cause and effect, not only a bi 
univocal connection. There is a chain of causes and a multitude of effects which in their turn can become causes. 
Predominant is the holistic thinking. In order not to fall in the trap of quietism, of the slow pluralism, the general 
theory of interpretation must take into account the validity of the hypothesis and the logic reasoning. Economics 
is seen as an assembly of the human actions and it is interconnected with praxeology and the language asks for 
the formal register, as to facilitate our interpretative step.  
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As any theory which is based on the principles of classic logic, the general theory of interpretation has 
its limitations, which do not weaken its status, but on the contrary it tries to limit the possible errors which can 
appear in the interpretative action. Moreover, we do not claim the unequivocal. 
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